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No. 6147.
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Apr. 29,

THE PEOPLE, Hespondent, v. LOWEU1
Appellant.*
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.
The evidence need not eonoborate an accomplice as to every
fact to which he testifies, but is suffieient if it does not
interpretation and direction from the testimony of the accomplice yet tends to connect defendant with the commission of
the offpnse in sueh a way as rPasonably may
a ;jury
that the accomplice is tt>lling the truth; it must tend to implicate defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact
which is an element of the crime, but it is not necessary that
the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish
every element of the offense charged.
[2] Receiving Stolen Goods-Evidence-Guilty Knowledge.-Possession of stolen property, accompanied by no explanntion or
an tmsatisfactory explanation of the possession or by suspicious cireumstances, will justify an inference that the goods
were received with knowledge that they had been stolen; the
rule is generally applied where the accused is found in possession of the articles soon after they were stolen.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 499; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1235
et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Receiving Stol&n Goods, § 8; Am.Jur., Receiving
Stolen Property, § 7.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 577(1); [2] Receiving Stolen Goods, § 9(4); [3, 5] Receiving Stolen Goods, § 7(4);
[4] Receiving Stolen Goods, §§ 7(4), 7(5); [6] Criminal Law,
§ 1335; [7, 41] Receiving Stolen Goods, § 9; [8] Criminal Law,
§ 658(1); [9, 10] Criminal Law,§ 141; [11] Criminal Law,§ 1084:
[12] Criminal Law, §§ 1092, 1409; [13] Criminal Law, § 1407; [14]
Criminal La.w, § 1403; [15, 17, 18] Criminal Law, § 621; [16] Criminal La.w, § 1407(6); [19] Criminal Law,§ 1404(11); [20] Crimina.!
La.w, § 104; [21] Criminal Law, §51; [22] Criminal Law, § 424:
[23] Criminal Law, § 1363; [24] Criminal La.w, § 1217; [25, 26]
Criminal Law,§ 589; [27] Criminal Law, § 793; [28] Criminal Law,
§682; [29] Criminal Law, §721; [30] Criminal Law, ~828; [31]
Criminal Law,~ 14cW(!l); [32] Criminal Law,§ 564(2); [33] Criminal Law, §34:i; [34] .Jnry, §80; [:35] Criminnl Law, ~2!H; [36J
Receiving Stolen Good~, §0(1); [:l7J Receiving Stolen Goods,
~ 7(3); [B8] Criminal Law, § 970(4); [il9] Criminal Law, § 952
(2); [40] Receiving Stolen Goods, §§ 7(il), 8.
*Reporter's N otc: This case was previously entitled '' I'coplc v.
Ferguson.''
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[3] !d.-Evidence-Guilty Knowledge .. ~F'alse or evasive answers
to material
with referenee to
of stolen
property tend to prove knowledge that it was stolen.
[4] Id -Evidence- Guilty Knowledge: Corroboration.-In a
pro~w:ution for reeeiving a stoh•n wat,•IJ, wlwre defendant
tedif1ed that he •·m11e into posst>ssion of th<' wat,·h the night
before his :urC'st, the jnry eould Jlnd that dd'P!Hlant's Rtate.
ment to a polit:e oftit-er, shortly after his anest, that the
wateh "\\"as his, that he lwd lwd it for smne time,'' was a
eonseiously evasive awl misleading explnnation; this was suffi.
cient to show a eousciousness of guilt .and justify an inferencP
that dd'endnnt n·e<?ived the wateh with knowl(•dge that it was
stolen, and snell evidem·e tends to comwet defendant with the
connnission of" the off,•use and satisfws the requirement that
areomplice tPstimony be eorroboratPd. (Pen. Code, § 1111.)
[5] !d.-Evidence-Guilty Knowledge.-Denial of possession of
stolen goods, if sueh denial is shown to be false, is a persuasive
circumstance tending to show guilty knowledge.
[6] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Accomplices and Corroboration.- \Vh~n it is discovered that there
is testimony, aside from that of an accomplice, which tends
to connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged,
the function of the reviewing court is performed, since questions of ~weight of e.-idence and credibility of witnesses are for
the trier of fact.
[7] Receiving Stolen Goods-Appeal-Review of Evidence.-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen property, uncertainties in the
thief's testimony as to just when defendant was present when
the thief delivered stolen property to an accomplice are for
determination by the trier of fact, not the reviewing court.
[8] Criminal Law-Province of Court and Jury-Credibility of
Witnesses.-An nppraisal of the effeet of a change in a police
offieer's testimony, made on rebuttal after he had discussed
his testimony with another officer in alleged violation of the
f'ourt's order sequestering witnesses, was for the trier of fact.
[9] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-An acquittal of
conspiracy to commit a crime is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for commission of the erime itself, though such crime is
alleg·ed in the conspiracy indictment as the sole overt act.
[10] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-An acquittal
of conspiracy to commit burglary :md to receive stolen property is not incomistent with conviction of substantive offenses
of receiving stolen goods, since defendant could be guilty of
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 179 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 381, 390.
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stolen goods without having conspired to receive
them.
[11] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Exclusion of Evidence and Offer.Where a question does not show on its face whether it is
material, the questioner, in order to claim error in sustaining
an objection thereto, must reframe it or make offer of proof
to show its materiality.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney: Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.Generally, where no objection is made to misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney, or where objection is made and the court
sustains the objection and properly admonishes the jury, the
misconduct claimed to be prejudicial to defendant's rights
will not furnish grounds sufficient to justify the granting
of a new trial or reversal of the judgment.
[13] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-Where a case is closely balanced and
acts of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney are such as to
contribute materially to the verdict, or where the act done
or remark made is of such character that a harmful result
cannot be cured by any retraction or instruction, the misconduct will furnish ground for reversal even where proper
admonitions are given.
[14] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct
of Prosecuting Attorney.-Whether a prosecutor was guilty
of prejudicial misconduct must be determined in the light of
the particular factual situation involved.
[15] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Statements in Retaliation.Where defense counsel in a prosecution for receiving stolen
property made implications that an attorney other than defendant should have been prosecuted, the prosecutor's remarks
that "it is not the function of the District Attorney's office to
go around recklessly indicting people and bringing charges
against them. Our duties are not to prosecute people just for
the sake of making prosecutions" fell within the scope of
proper argument as an answer to such implications and constituted an attempt to clarify for the jury matters which might
have confused them; any inference to the effect that the prosecutor had extrajudicial knowledge of defendant's guilt was
slight and was susceptible to cure by admonition.
[16] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for conspiracy and
for receiving stolen property, where the prosecutor in his
argument to the jury stated that there was the insinuation
that all of the People's witnesses who were accomplices or
connected with defendant were allowed to plead guilty to
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one or two of several counts, his
remarks that
"If we took a
of two Counts
and one
Count
the
we will offer
at any time during this
same
trial he wanted to plead guilty to one Count, or if he would like
to do so even now, we will give him the same eonsideration,"
were eured by the court's admonition that the
disregard
the statement
any offer to accept a plea from
defendant.
!d.-Argument of Counsel-statements in Betaliation.-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen property, remarks by the
Pl'"'"'""'vL in his
argument to the jury that the reason
some of the stolen jewelry or fur coats were not in
was that the State could not show defendant's connection with them did not imply that the prosecutor had personal
knowledge of defendant's guilt but were, in view of the fact
that defense counsel had earlier called the jury's attention to
the fact that certain items referred to in the testimony had
not been introduced into evidence, a legitimate explanation
to the jury why such items had not been introduced, and even
assuming that the remarks were improper their substance
could not be said to have contributed materially to the verdict.
[18] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Statements in Betaliation.-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen property, remarks o£ the
prosecutor in his argument to the jury that "it is evident . • •
that if anyone would have been given consideration by the
Police Department, it would have been the son of a former
policeman. They would not discriminate against a policeman's
son," did not amount to an avowal of his personal belie£ in
defendant's guilt, but were made in answer to defense counsel's earlier assertions that defendant incurred the wrath of
the police department by bringing several suits against its
members and the police were out to "settle" defendant "once
and for all."
[19] Id.-Appeal-Rarmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen
property, the prosecutor's conduct in twice referring to defendant as the "mouthpiece" for his accomplices, though improper,
was not ground for reversal where it did not appear that any
different verdict would have been probable had the prosecutor
not used the term.
[20] !d.-Bights of Accused-Fair 'l'rial.-In a prosecution for
receiving stolen property, defendant's claim that he was denied
a fair trial in that the district attorney and the court coerced
accomplices to testify untruthfully against him was not substantiated where it appeared that the accomplices pleaded
guilty to certain charges brought against them and that the
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court postponed their ~entencing from time to time until after
they had testified for the prosecution against defendant, and
where the prosecutor frankly admitted to the jury that "inducements" (obviously promises of reduced sentences) had
been offered, these facts going to the credibility, not the
competency, of such testimony.
[21] !d.-Immunity to One Furnishing Evidence.-The fact that
promises of leniency were conditioned on accomplices' first
testifying against defendant does not render such testimony
worthless as a matter of law or so inherently incredible as to
result in incompetency where there is nothing to indicate that
such promises were conditioned on anything other than the
accomplices' testifying fully and fairly as to their knowledge
of the facts out of which the charges arose; the court's failure
to sentence the accomplices until after they testified was not
so serious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
[22] !d.-Evidence-Explanation For Failure to Produce Witness.
-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, it was not
error to admit testimony of a process server that he twice
served a subpoena on the person in whose hotel room defendnut was arrested, and that he again attempted to serve him
but could not find him, wh('re such hotel roomer did not appear
at the trial, where the prosecuting attorney in argument said
that he "would like to have had [the roomer] here ... to clear
up some of the inconsistencies in the defendant's story," and
where, though there was no showing that the roomer's testimony would have been favorable to the prosecution, the
prosecution was entitled to explain why he was not produced,
to forestall any question which might arise in the minds of the
jury as to why he did not testify.
[23] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Trial-Rebuttal.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, alleged error in permitting the questioning of an officer in rebuttal by reading
from a transcript portions of a conversation at which he, other
officers, a hotel roomer and defendant were present, and
asking the officer whether the conversation occurred, did not
constitute ground for reversal where, though the questioning
was somewhat confusing and the so-called rebuttal was not
strictly rebuttal, defendant could not have been prejudiced in
this regard.
[24] Id.- Appeal- Record-Amendment and Correction.-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen property, defendant could not
successfully complain that the transcript was altered where
there was nothing in the record to show that the transcript
was not altered to correct it so that it would reflect the truth.
[25] !d.-Conduct of Counsel-Suppression of Evidence.-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen property, where an accom-
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plice testified that he
receiver a certain sum
for which the receiver obtained a driver's license for the
accomplice under a fictitious name and that the accomplice
believed defendant was present during some of the conversations which led to the obtaining of the false license, which was
received in evidence at defendant's request but marked as a
People's exhibit, where defendant called an officer to the stand
and he answered negatively questions whether he had caused
an examination of the thumb print and signature on the
license to be made and whether he had any idea whose thumb
print and handwriting app€wred thereon, and where to the
question, "And as you sit there now you have no idea who
wrote on that application "I" to which the officer testified, "No,
I don't," whereupon the prosecuting attorney made an objection, stating "We all have an idea after listening to the
evidence," the People did not suppress evidence that the
thumb print was not that of defendant and no such implication
appeared from the prosecuting attorney's quoted statement;
rather, "after listening to the evidence," it appeared that the
originnl receiver obtnined the license for the accomplice on
application of an unidentified person who answered the accomplice's general description.
[26] !d.-Conduct of Counsel-Suppression of Evidence.-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen property, where an officer
testified that when defendant was questioned about a stolen
watch he "said it was his, that he had had it for some time,"
but defendant testified that he did not make such statement,
and where on defense counsel's cross-examinntion of the officer
he testified that the interrogation of defendant was recorded
but that he did not have a transcript of the conversation
concerning the watch, defendant could not successfully assert
that this portion of the conversation was recorded and the
recording suppressed, it appearing that, though the conversation occurred immediately after defendant was taken to the
office of the police, it may have been that the recording of
defendant's questioning had not commenced.
[27] Id.-Instructions-Presumptions.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, defendant could not successfully complain that the jury were not instructed that private transactions
are presumed to be fair and regular (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963,
subd. 19), and that the court gave no instruction embodying
the principle that a defendant is presumed to speak the truth,
where defendant did not request such instructions, and where,
though there was no instruction specifically directed to defendant's explanation of events as opposed to that of any other
witness, the court instructed the jury at length concerning
the appraisal of the credibility of witnesses, and among other
things the jury were told that a witness is presumed to speak
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the truth and that such presumption may be repelled by the
manner in which he testifies, his interest in the case, his bias
or prejudice for or against any of the parties, the character of
his testimony, or contradictory evidence.
[28] !d.-Invasion by Court of Province of Jury-Singling Out
Witnesses.-It is improper for the court to single out a particular witness and charge the jury how his evidence should
be considered.
[29] !d.-Instructions-Refusal of Requests Covered by Other
Instructions.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property,
defendant could not successfully complain that the court refused his requested instruction that "The fact that an indictment has been filed ... is not to be considered by you ... on
the proposition of the guilt or innocence of this defendant"
and that the plea of not guilty raises the presumption of innocence, where this instruction was covered by other, more
accurate instructions.
(30] !d.-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-In a prosecution for receiving stolen property, defendant could not successfully complain of the refusal of a requested instruction
that the testimony of an alleged coconspirator should be
examined with great care in case he had been tendered immunity from prosecution in reward for his State's evidence
ag·ainst his alleged colleague, where the substance was covered
in other instructions.
[3la, 31b] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.--Failure to instmct that proof independent of extrajudicial stateutents of dt>f<>ndant is rwcessary to prove the
corpus ddieti, though enor, was not reversible under the cir<·mnstnnces in a prosecution for reeeiving stolen property.
[32] !d.-Evidence-Corpus Delicti.-Uncorroborated testimony of
accomplices is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.
[33] !d.-Taking Articles to Jury Room.-Assuming that exhibits,
including allegedly stolen property, were taken into the jury
room by "armed guards" without request by the jury, such
conduct WHs not error where it did not appear that such eonduct could exert any improper influence on the jury or influ<>nce them to believe that the ass<>rtedly stolen exhibits
wt>re in fact stolen.
[34] Jury-Objections.-A defendant has no right to complain
that the number of challenges to the jury was limited by
denial of his motion for severance of his trial from that of
his codefendant where there is no showing that he exhausted
his peremptory ehalleng<>s, since he was not prejudiced in this
regard.
[35] Criminal Law-Separate Trials of Defendants Jointly Accused.-The fact that a defendant charged with conspiracy
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to commit burglary and who was the actual burglar sat at the
defense end of the counsel table before testifying against
another defendant accused of receiving the stolen property
did not furnish good reason for granting the second defendant's motion for severance of his trial from that of the first
defendant, and he was not prejudiced thereby since, if both
had been tried separately, the first defendant could have
testified against the second.
[36] Receiving Stolen Goods-Indictment and Information-Proof
and Variance.--~Th<•re was no varianee between a dwt'ge of
receiving· stoletl property and aliPged proof that defendant
was guilty of burglary as a conspirator, under the theory that
he could not commit the crime of receiving stolen property
from himself, where defendant was found not guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary and to receive stolen goods;
defendant could be found guilty as a receiver not pursuant
to a prearranged plan but as a transaction independent of the
burglary.
[37] Id.-Evidence-Accomplices.---Assuming that defendant and
accomplices agreed in advance that the accomplices should
steal property and defendant would receive it, the legal effect
of such conspiracy would not be to exonerate any of its
participants from any crime committed pursuant to the agreement, but rather would support a holding that all were accomplices in the offense or offenses resulting from execution of
such plan.
[38] Criminal Law-New Trial-Discretion of Court-Newly Discovered Evidence.-On a motion for new trial, where conflicting affidavits are filed, the question of fact is for determination
of the trial judge whose finding will not be disturbed on appeal
if there is substantial evidence to sustain it.
[39] Id.-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence-Character of
Evidence.-It was not improper to deny a new trial for newly
discovered evidence where it was not reasonably probable that
the evidence, cumulative and impeaching, would have caused
the jury to reach a different conclusion regarding defendant's
guilt.
[40] Receiving Stolen Goods-Evidence: Sentence on Conviction
on Different Counts.-Evidence that defendant originally received a stolen watch and fur coat on a single occasion showed
but one offense of receiving stolen property, though the goods
were stolen from different sources, and the duality of two
separate sentences on convictions on different counts, though
the sentences are ordered to run concurrently, cannot be permitted to stand.
[41] !d.-Appeal-Disposition of Cause.-Where it was improper
to impose separate sentences (to run concurrently) on convic-
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tion of receiving a stolen watch and fur coat on different
counts because both articles were received by defendant on a
single occasion, and where neither the State nor defendant
would be prejudiced by a simple reversal as to one count and
affirmance as to the other, this procedure should be followed
as more desirable than that of reversing the judgments as to
both eounts, ordering such counts consolidated, and remanding
the cause for rearraignment of defendant for sentence and for
sentence on the consolidated count.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Walter R Evans, ,Judge.* ,T udgment affirmed in part and
reversed in part; order affirmed.
Prosecution for receiving stolen property. Judgment of
conviction based on one count affirmed, and based on another
count reversed.
Hiehard II. Cantillon, under appointment by the District
Court of Appeal, Cantillon & Cantillon, R Michael Cantillon
and JameB P. Cantillon for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Elizabeth Miller and
William B. James, Deputy Attorneys General, S. Ernest Roll,
District Attorney (Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Fred
N. \Vhichello, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent.
SCHAUEH, J.-Lowell Lyo~1s (hereinafter called defendant), Paul Ferguson, and James Pope were charged by indictment (count 1) with conspiracy to commit burglary and to
receive stolen property; defendant and Ferguson were further eharged (counts 2 through 6) with five counts of reeeiving stolen property. Ferguson pleaded guilty as charged
in count 2 and his cause was referred to the probation department for a report; his only appearance at the trial was as
a witness for the prosecution. Pope and defendant pleaded
not guilty. Pope went to trial with defendant but during
the trial the one count against him (eonspiracy) was dismissed on the People's motion and he was called as a witness
for the prosecution.
A jury found defendant 110t guilty under counts 1, 2, and
:~ and guilty as d1arged in eouuts 5 (receiving a stolen wateh,
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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the property of Aaron Rothenberg) and 6 (receiving a
stolen fur coat, the property of Donald Thomas Handy). t
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms in the state
prison. He presents numerous assignments of error, including the contention that there is insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of accomplice-witnesses. For the reasons hereinafter stated we have concluded that the matters
complained of by defendant, subsequently detailed, either are
not error or, in the circumstances, did not result in a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%), except that
defendant should have been sentenced for only one count of
receiving stolen goods.
Ferguson, Pope, and Dann Rio, witnesses for the prosecution, were accomplices aecording to a possible view of their
own testimony. The jury were instructed that if the crimes
charged were committed by anyone, then these witnesses were
accomplices as a matter of law and that the testimony of
an accomplice is to be viewed with distrust and must be
corroborated.
To show that there is inculpatory evidence apart from the
testimony of the accomplices we first set forth a summary
of such inculpatory evidence. Defendant himself testified
as follows: He was a lawyer with practice largely in the
field of criminal law. He represented Ferguson, who was
charged in a federal case with conspiracy. On a number of
occasions defendant accompanied Ferguson in the latter's
car; on such occasions defendant would drive because he
knew that Ferguson "was an ex-convict and couldn't drive
an automobile legally." Through Ferguson defendant met
James Pope under the alias of James England. Through
''England'' defendant met Dann Rio and undertook to represent Rio in a narcotics case. Rio gave defendant $100 as a
retainer. Subsequently Rio informed defendant that he was
unable to raise the additional fee and, according to defendant's testimony at the trial, on the night of April 7, 1955 (the
night before defendant's arrest), Rio "handed me that watch
[the subject of count 5] and told me it ought to be worth
$50.00 off the fee . . . and although I had a watch at the
time I did accept that watch from Mr. Rio." Mr. Rothenberg,
the owner of the watch, testified that it was stolen from his
house in a burglary committed during his absence sometime
between April 2 and April 7, 1955. Officer Hooper testified
tCount 4 was dismissed.
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that he questioned defendant at the eity hall shortly after
defendant's arrest; "I asked him to remove the property
from his pockets; he put his property on the desk; in the
property wa,; a man's Helbros pocket watch. I asked him
where he bad gotten this watch, be said it was his, that he
had had it for some time.''
. A.s to count 6, receiving a stolen fur coat, the corroborative
evidence is as follows: The owner of the eoat testified that
it was stolen on the evening of April 7, 1955. Officer Roberts
testified that on the morning of April 8, 1955, he saw defendant carrying a blue bag on which were the letters '' P AA'';
the bag was "stuffed fulL" Defendant was accompanied by
Perguson, who was carrying a beer carton. They entered the
Crest HoteL "[T] hree or four minutes" after defendant
and Perguson entered the hotel officers followed them to the
room of one Gallo. Officer 0 'Mara testified that he and the
other officers entered Gallo's room. Defendant "said, 'Who
are you 'I' I said, 'I am a police officer.' And I said, 'Yon are
under arrest.' And he said, 'What for?' And I said, 'Por
investigation of stolen articles.' '' The beer carton was on
the floor. On it lay a fur piece (not the subject of count 6).
Also on the floor was the blue bag, closed. An officer opened
it and found in it the fur coat whieh is the subject of count
6 and three white shirts .
Defendant testified that at least two of the shirts were his;
that he had put them in the automobile in which he drove
to the Crest Hotel; and that "to my knowledge" they were
not in Gallo's room. Officer Hooper testified that when,
shortly after defendant's arrest, the officer questioned defendant in the eity hall, "I asked Mr. Lyons about the fur coats
that had been found in the room, he said that he hadn't seen
any fur coats, didn't know what I was talking about."
'l'he aeeompliee Perguson testified as follows: He met defendant in November, 1954. 'l'hereafter Pope got in touch
with Ferguson and met him about a dozen times when defendant was present. On April 7, 1955, Rio, Pope, Ferguson,
and defendant were present at a conversation when Pope
"stated how much he would like to get from that fur coat"
(the subjeet of count 6) ; "for the fur coat and three pieces
of jewelry he stated he would like it to bring $200.00." The
next morning Perguson took a fur coat in a beer carton and
defendant took the fur coat which is the subject of count 6
in a bag initialed '' P AA'' to Gallo's room. Gallo ''asked
how much he was supposed to ask" for the furs; Ferguson
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said :f;lJOO: Uallo "t,aid lw \ronld try to
t!Jat mueh, he
wouldn't kllow until he saw his parties on the other end of the
line . . . .About that time the pol ice oflleers eame in and
arrested us. ''
In February, 1955, while Ferguson was in the eounty jail
he heard of one Newton Erwin, who was also in jail ''and I had
a sort of sympathy for the man, aHd he want<"d to make bail
l:nd it seemed as though he didn't have any eo] lateral to make
bail. . . . I told Mr. Lyons that I thought lVIr". Erwin was a
very nice gentleman . . . , and if there was anything we
could do to further his bond I would like to do it." At a
subsequent conversation among Mr. Davila, a bail bond broker,
Ferguson and Lyons, it was agreed that fur coats obtained
from Pope would be ''put up . . . as collateral for Mr.
Erwin's bond,'' and this was done.
Ferguson further described the sale of a fur coat, negotiated
by Ferguson and defendant, to a Mr. Millin. 'fhe proceeds
of the sale were turned over to Pope.
Davila and Millin, respectively, corroborated the testimony
of Ferguson concerning the transactions with them.
The accomplice Pope testified as follows: On March 17,
1955, he was introdueed to defendant by Ferguson whom
he had known for 12 years. In defendant's presence Pope
"stated that I had numerous articles which I wished to dispose of. . . . Mr. Ferguson stated he could handle the matter
for me . . . . I advised Paul [Ferguson] I had several furs
and numerous small items of jewelry.'' There was not ''any
mention made as to where these artie] es came from." On
Mareh 18, 1955, in the presence of defendant, Pope turned
over to Ferguson jewelry and furs. Ferguson '' Rtated that
he was not holding . . . That is a slang expression meaning
broke . . . . I stated that I would give them a good break
on the deal,'' that is, $200. '' [I] n the course of the general
conversation it was brought out that I was hot . . . that I
had escaped.'' There was ''general conversation'' concerning
burglaries and Ferguson ''advised me to stay as low as possible, in view of the fact that I was an escapee, and . . . keep
the heat on myself down to a minimum.'' There was conversation concerning obtaining identification for Pope under
the name of .Tames England at a cost of $50.
At a third meeting among defendant, Pope, and Ferguson,
Ferguson paid Pope $200; Pope handed Ferguson $50 to obtain a driver's license and other identification; and Pope delivered jewelry and furs to Ferguson.
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At a subsequent meeting among Ferguson, defendant,
and Pope, Ferguson delivered to Pope a receipt for the application fee for a driver's license. 'I' hereafter Ferguson
delivered the license in the name "Robert Englund" to Pope.
Thereafter Pope committed various burglaries and stole
fnrs and jewelry and delivered some of them to Ferguson in
the presence of defendant. He delivered stolen furs to Ferguson in defendant's presence on "perhaps four" occasions.
Among the items which he stole were the subjects of counts
5 and 6. He stole the watch and fur coat which are the
subjects of those counts on April 7, 1955, and took them to
Rio's apartment. Ferguson and defendant arrived and Pope
gave defendant the watch "as an additional $25.00 fee against
Mr. Rio's bill."
The accomplice Dann Rio testified that on April 7, 1955,
he, defendant, Perguson and Pope had a conversation in Rio's
apartment ''with reference to how much money ·we wanted
for the fur pieces . . . l W] e agreed on the sum of $200 for
it, that and some jewelry." The fur coat which is the subject Of count 6 was put in a blue bag initialed "P AA" and
carried from Rio's apartment; Rio did not remember who put
the coat in the bag or who carried it from the apartment.
The rules concerning the sufficiency of evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice are as follows: Section 1111 of the Penal Code, provides, in part: ''A conviction
cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it
be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof . . . "
[1] The evidence need not corroborate the accomplice as
to every fact to which he testifies but is sufficient if it does
not require interpretation and direction from the testimony
of the accomplice yet tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it
must tend to implicate the defendant and therefore must
relate to some act or fact which is an element of the crime but
it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense
charged. (People v. Brown (1958), 49 Cal.2d 577, G83-584
[1, 2] [320 P.2d 5]; People v. llf.acEwing (1955), 45 Cal.2d
218, 223-225 [2, 3, 6, 7] [288 P.2d 257] ; People v. Santo
(1954), 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [4, 7] [273 P.2d 249]; People v.
50 C.2d-9
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, 43 CaL2d
563 [4, 5]
P.2d 31];
People v. Gallardo (1953), 41 CaL2d 57, 62 [5, 6] [257 P.2d
29]; People v. Barclay (1953), 40 CaL2d 146, 156 [13a, 14]
[252 P.2d 321].)
Defendant does not attempt to controvert the evidence that
the watch had been stolen and was in defendant's possession
at the time of his arrest, but contends that there is insufficient
corroborative evidence to show guilty knowledge that the
watch had been stolen. [2] As stated in People v. Lopez
(1954), 126 Cal..~:\.pp.2d 274, 278 [4] [271 P.2d 874], "[P]ossession of stolen property, accompanied by no explanation,
or an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession, or by
suspicions circumstances, will justify an inference that
the goods were received with knowledge that they had been
stolen. The rule is generally applied where the accused is
found in possession of the articles soon after they were
stolen.'' [3] ''False or evasive answers to material questions
with reference to the ownership of stolen property tend to
prove such knowledge." (People v. Reynolds (1957), 149
Cal.App.2d 290, 294 [2] [308 P.2d 48]; see also People v.
Cole (1903), 141 Cal. 88, 90 [74 P. 547]; People v. Boinus
(1957), 153 Cal.App.2d 618, 621-622 [1, 2, 3] [314 P.2d 787] ;
People v. Malonf (1955), 135 Cal.App.2d 697, 707 [8, 9] [287
P.2d 834] ; People v. Hartridge (1955), 134 Cal.App.2d 659,
665 [6] [286 P.2d 72]; People v. Boyclen (1953), 116 Cal.
App.2d 278, 288 [12, 13, 14] [253 P.2d 773]; People v. Jacobs
(1925), 73 Cal.App. 334, 339-343 [2, 3, 4] [238 P. 770].)
[4] The jury could find that defendant's statement to the
police officer, shortly after his arrest, that the watch "was
his, that he had had it for some time" was a consciously
evasive and misleading explanation. Under the authorities
cited above this is sufficient to show a consciousness of guilt
and justify an inference that defendant received the watch
with knowledge that it was stolen. ( Cf. People v. Wayne
(1953), 41 Cal.2d 814, 823 [ 4, 5] [264 P.2d 547].) It follows that such evidence tends to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense and satisfies the requirements
of section 1111 of the Penal Code. (People v. Santo (1954),
supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [9].)
[5] As to the fur coat which is the subject of count 6 the
jury eould find that defendant falsely stated "that he hadn't
seen any fur coats, didn't know what I was talking about."
The trier of fact was entitled to believe that defendant had
the fur coat in his possession under suspicious circumstances,
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yet, when questioned concerning that possession, offered no
innocent explanation but rather falsely denied the fact of
possession. Denial of possession of the goods, if such denial
is shown to be false, is a persuasive circumstance tending to
show guilty knowledge. (People v. Hartridge (1955), supra,
134 Cal.App.2d 659, 665 [6]; People v. Boyden (1953), supra,
116 Cal.App.2d 278, 288 [13].)
[6] It is true that much of the evidence stated above was
controverted. But, as stated in People v. Henderson (1949),
34 Ca1.2d 340, 346-347 [6] [209 P.2d 785], "When as in the
present record it is discovered that there is testimony aside
from that of the accomplice which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, the function of
the appellate court is performed. Questions of the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are for the
trial court, and since the circumstances reasonably justify
the finding of guilt, an opposing view that they also may be
reconciled with innocence will not warrant interference with
the judgment on appeal." Regardless of how we might think
we would resolve the confliets if we were initially trying the
issues of fact, our duty in the appellate function is clear.
[7] This is true also as to uncertainties in Pope's testimony
as to just when defendant was present when Pope delivered
stolen property to Ferguson. (See People v. Daugherty
(1953), 40 Cal.2d 876, 885 [4, 5] [256 P.2d 911]; People v.
Newland (1940), 15 Cal.2d 678, 680-684 [1] [104 P.2d 778],
and eases cited.)
Officer Roberts testified during the People's case in chief
that when defendant and Ferguson went into the Crest Hotel
"Mr. Lyons was carrying a cardboard box and Mr. Ferguson
was carrying a blue handbag with the letters P AA on the
side.'' Then in answer to the question, ''This blue bag that
you say Lyons was carrying, did it appear to have anything
in it?" the witness answered, "Yes, it was stuffed full." On
rebuttal Officer Roberts corrected his testimony, stating that
"Mr. Ijyons was carrying the blue bag with the P AA, and
Mr. Ferguson the box.'' Defendant's counsel objected to
this rebuttal testimony. He said, ''There is apparently a
conflict, and that is why we had these witnesses excluded.
[There was an order for exclusion of witnesses from the
courtroom vvhen they were not testifying.] Now he is bringing
him back in and the witness is changing his testimony.'' The
court ruled, ''If the witness wants to explain any mistaken
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statements made, made in error, he may do so at this time.''
On cross-examination on rebuttal Officer Roberts testified
that on the night before his rebuttal testimony Officer Hooper
called his attention ''to the mistake that was in the transcript.'
[8] Defendant asserts that Officer Roberts "After admitting that he had violated the trial court's order sequestering
the witnesses, in that he had discussed his testimony with Sgt.
Hooper, changed his testimony in this respect." The appraisal
of the effect of this change in testimony on Officer Roberts'
credibility was for the trier of fact.
Defendant urged that the verdict of not guilty as to the
conspiracy count was inconsistent with the verdicts of guilty
as to counts 5 and 6 because among the overt acts charged
in the conspiracy count were the possession by defendant of
the articles which are the subjects of counts 5 and 6.
[9] "[T]he overwhelming weight of authority is that the
acquittal of a defendant of the crime of conspiracy to commit
a crime is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution of said defendant for the commission of said crime, even though said
crime is alleged in the conspiracy indictment as the sole overt
act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.'' (People v.
JfacJi1dlen (1933), 218 Cal. 655, 656 [1] [24 P.2d 793];
People v. Lyon (1955), 135 CaLApp.2d 558, 586 [19] [288
P.2d 57], and cases cited [conviction of conspiracy does not
place defendant in double jeopardy when he is subsequently
prosecuted for the main crime].)
[10] It follows that
acquittal of conspiracy here is not inconsistent with conviction of substantive offenses of receiving stolen goods. Defendant could, in fact, be guilty of receiving stolen goods
without having conspired to receive them. ( Cf. People v.
Keyes (1930), 103 Cal.App. 624, 632, 646 [284 P. 1096].)
On cross-examination of Officer Hooper defense counsel
asked, "Now, how many times from the 8th of April, 1955,
to this day have you talked to Mr. Pope 1" An objection that
this was ''outside the scope of direct examination'' was sustained. Defense counsel stated, "it is on the limited proposition of motive that I am offering it-bias, prejudice'' and
the court replied, ''I think the ruling will stand.'' In his
brief defendant asserts, ''That he [Officer Hooper] had contacted the witness Pope an unusual number of times, wined
and dined with him would go to show that prejudice.''
However, defense counsel did not make an offer of proof in
the trial court that he was attempting to show an unusual
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number or type of meetings between Hooper and Pope;
defense counsel's question of Hooper might only have elicited
the information that Hooper talked with Pope on a number
of occasions in the ordinary course of his investigation.
[11] .Where the question does not show on its face whether
or not it is material, the questioner, in order to claim error
in sustaining an -Dbjection thereto, must reframe it or make
offer of proof to show its materiality. (People v. Singh (1920),
182 Cal. 457, 482 [19] [188 P. 987]; People v. Monson (1951),
102 Cal.App.2d 308, 313 [6, 8] [227 P.2d 521]; People v.
Fredecn (1950), 101 Cal.App.2d 105, 107 ..108 [4] [224 P.2d
849] ; People v. McDonald (1930), 110 Cal.App. 183, 187 [3]
[293 P. 883]; see People v. Brown (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d
430, 433 [110 P.2d 1059].)
Defendant's contention that the deputy district attorney
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct is likewise without merit.
In the course of his argument to the jury the deputy district
attorney stated: ''Remember, ladies and gentlemen, Mr.
Haley [an attorney who permitted Ferguson to store property
on his premises] is not on trial here. Maybe th1:s is a good
point to bring up right now, btlt it is not the ftmction of the
District Attorney's office to go around recklessly indicting
people and bringing charges against them. Our dut·ies are
not to prosecute people just for the sake of making prosecu ..
tions. It is our duty to protect the citizens of the County
against crimes.
"If the evidence disclosed that Mr. Haley actually had
possession of that property, knowing it to be stolen, then the
Grand Jury might have indicted Mr. Haley. But they did
not. Do we have any evidence that Mr. Haley associated with
Mr. Pope and Mr. Ferguson, as we have against Mr. Lyons?
Do we have any evidence that Mr. Haley went to their homes,
as we have against Mr. Lyons? Do we have any evidence that
Mr. Haley acted as their mouthpiece, as we have against Mr.
Lyons? If Mr. Haley was a party to a crime, proper govern ..
mental agencies will take care of that, but right now we are
concerned only with Mr. Lyons. And when they say, 'Here
is another attorney who did all this. In other words, I am
not the only person dipping my fingers into the till. Why
don't you get these other people?' Well, he is the only one
here on trial and we are not concerned with anyone else.''
(Italics added.)
Although no objection was made at the trial, defendant now
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contends that
of the above statement
constituted prejudicial misconduet in that it implied to the
the deputy district attorney had extrajudicial
of defendant's
[12] As stated in People
(1936), 6 Ca1.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136], "The
rule regarding misconduct of the district attorney
which tends to and is likely to result in prejudiee to the defendant is that where no objection is made to sueh miseonduet
the defendant, or where objection is made and the
court sustains the objection and properly admonishes the jury,
the misconduet claimed to be prejudicial to defendant's rights
will not furnish grounds suffkieut to justify the g-ranting of
a new trial or the reversal of the judgment. I Citation.]
[13] 'J'here are two exceptions to this general rule. One is
where the caRe is elosely balanced and there is grave doubt
of defendant's guilt, and the acts of misconduct are such as
to eontribnte materially to the verdict, a misearriage of
justice results requiring a reversal. [Citation.] The other
exception is INhere the act done or remark made is of such a
character that a harmful result cannot be obviated or cured
by any retraction of counsel or instruction of the court. In
such cases the misconduct will furnish ground for a reversal
of the judgment, even where proper admonitions are given by
the court. [Citations.]" [14] Whether a prosecutor has
been guilty of prejudicial misconduct must be determined in
the light of the particular factual situation involved. Previous
authority is of little help. Suffice it to say that the conduct
of the deputy district attorney here involved, did not approach the extraordinary misconduct revealed in such cases
as People v. Kirkes (1952), 39 Cal.2d 719, 723-724 [1-4] [249
P.2d 1]; People v. Vienne (1956), 142 Cal.App.2d 172, 173
[2a] [297 P.2d 1027]; People v. Teixeira (1955), 136 Cal.
App.2d 136, 147-148 [288 P.2d 535]; and People v. Talle
(1952), 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 673-677 [8-12] [245 P.2d 633],
cited by defendant. Nor is this a case such as People v. Hale
(1947), 82 Cal.App.2d 827, 838 [187 P.2d 121], where the
trial court failed to sustain defendant's objections to the
improper statements of the prosecuting attorney and made
comments which tended to classify the prosecutor's remarks
as a summation of the testimony and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom.
[15] In the subject ease, just before making the above
quoted remarks, the deputy district attorney posed the question, "Why isn't Mr. Haley [a prosecution witness] in here
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as a defendanU" This rhetorical question apparently related
back to the fact that a defense attorney argued that "The
only reason Mr. Haley is immunized is because he is putting
Mr. Lyons in this case.'' The other defense counsel argued
that "Mr. Haley said he did not know Mr.
. .. Yet
he had all this property . . . Mr.
had
he had
it all in his house." Whether or not Mr.
plice, the fact is that his
was not
Thus
when considered in context the italicized portions of the prosecutor's remarks appear to fall within the scope of proper
argument as an answer to the implications of defense counsel
that Haley should have been prosecuted and to constitute
an attempt to clarify for the jury matters which
have
confused them. (Of. People v. Perkin (1948), 87 CaLApp.
2d 865, 867-869 [2] [197 P .2d 39 J.) Any inference to the
ef!ect that the deputy district attorney had extrajudicial
knowledge of the defendant's guilt is slight and was certainly
susceptible to cure by admonition.
The foregoing remarks are equally applicable to other
statements, set out below, which defendant contends indicated to the jury that the prosecutor had extrajudicial knowledge of the defendant's guilt.
[16] In his argument to the jury the district attorney
also stated: "And there has been only the insinuation, the
insinuation that all of the People's witnesses who were accomplices or in any way connected with the defendant, were
allowed to plead guilty to only one or two Counts. Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, that is a matter, I believe, of common
knowledge, that if there are three or four Counts against
some defendant, that defendant is permitted to take a plea
to one or more of the Counts. And even after three days of
trial they allowed Mr. Moeckel to plead guilty to two Counts
of Robbery. Why? It is obvious. In his sentence the Judge
made the sentences run concurrently. Why
him on two
or three or four Counts when he can be found guilty on one
Count, or when he pleads guilty to one or two Counts?
The Judge made the sentences run concurrently. If we took
a plea of two Counts against Pope and one Count against
Mr. Ferguson, tke big reeeiver, we will offer Mr. Lyons tke
same consideration. If at any time during tkis trial ke wanted
to plead guilty to one Count, or if he would like to do so even
now, we will give him tke same consideration. u (Italics
added.) The court sustained defendant's objection to the
italicized portion of the prosecutor's remarks and instructed
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the jury "to disregard the statement of counsel regarding
any offer to accept a plea from Mr. Lyons." Defendant now
argues that the admonition was insufficient to cure the error.
In the light of the circumstances indicated above, the contention is without merit.
[17] In the concluding phase of his closing argument the
deputy district attorney stated: ''And some of the jewelry
is not in evidence. And the reason for that is because we
could not show Mr. Lyons' connection with the other fur
coats or with the other jewelry. The fur coat carried in this
bag, . . . and that is here, but the fnr coat carried by Mr.
Ferguson in that cardboard box is not here because we cannot show Mr. Lyons' connection with that fur coat. . . .
The reason the other furs are not here is because we could
not connect Mr. Lyons with them." Defendant made no
objection at the time but now contends the remarks implied
to the jury that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of
defendant's guilt. The contention is without merit. Defense
counsel had earlier called the jury's attention to the fact that
certain items referred to in the testimony had not been introduced into evidence. The remarks of the deputy district
attorney were a legitimate explanation to the jury why such
items had not been introduced. Even if we should assume
that the remarks were improper their substance cannot be said
to have contributed materially to the verdict.
[18] 'l'he deputy district attorney also argued as follows:
"Btd it is evident, ladies and gentlemen, that if anyone
wottld have been given considemtion by the Police Department, it would have been the son of a former policeman. l'hey
wmtld not discriminate against a pol1:ccman's son. On the contrary, it seems to me that they would have gone all out to
give him every break poo;sible.
"Mr. Cantillon [an attorney for the defendant] referred
to 'Inspector Lyons' but I don't know what his father was.
But I do know that the evidence has certainly shown the
defendant is not a chip off the old block." (Italics added.)
Defendant interposed no objection but now contends the
italici11ed portion of the prose(~utor 's remarks amounted to
an avowal of his personal belief in defendant's guilt. However the statements of the prose(•utor are a mere assertion
of what he claimed was "evident" or that "the evidence has
certainly shown,'' and were made in answer to defense counsel's assertions to the effect that defendant had ineurred the
wrath of the police department by bringing several suits
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against its members and the police were out to "settle"
defendant "once and for all." No error appears in this
instance.
[19] Defendant also urges that the deputy district attorney committccd prejudicial misconduct by twice referring to
the defendant as the "mouthpiece" for his accomplices. No
objection was interposed at the trial. The term carries an
unsavory connotation in the minds of many persons. Its use
was improper and should not be condoned. However, under
the facts of this case, it does not appear that any different
verdict would have been probable had the deputy district
attorney not used the term. It follows that its use is not
ground for reversal. (People v. Watson (1956), 46 Cal.2d
818, 835, 836 [12] [299 P.2d 243] .)
[20] Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial
in that the district attorney and superior court coerced the
accomplices to testify untruthfully against him. This claim
is not substantiated by the record. It does appear that the
accomplices pleaded guilty to certain charges brought against
them and that the court postponed their sentencing from time
to time until after they had testified for the prosecution
against defendant. 'l.'his fact was brought out upon crossexamination and the prosecutor frankly admitted to the jury
that "inducements" had been offered the accomplices for their
testimony. 'l.'he ''inducements'' obviously were promises of
reduced sentences. These facts go to the credibility, not the
competency, of the accomplices' testimony. (People v. Pantages (1931), 212 Cal. 237, 252-259 [8, 9, 10] [297 P. 890].)
They furnish the defendant with a powerful weapon for
attacking the credibility of the inherently suspect witnesses
but since the jury were fully apprised of the facts and section 1111 of the Penal Code was satisfied, we cannot hold
that the trial is shown to have been unfair in fact or in law.
[21] Defendant, however, urges that since the proffered
leniency was obviously conditioned on the accomplices' first
testifying against defendant, that testimony was worthless
as a matter of law, relying primarily on People v. Green
(1951), 102 Cal.App.2d 831 [228 P.2d 867], and cases therein
discussed. But in that case the promise of immunity was
conditioned on the accomplice's testimony resulting in the
conviction of the defendant. The Green case recognizes, at
page 838 of 102 Cal.App.2d, that, "It is a practice which
seems to be approved in all jurisdictions, if the ends of justice
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upon condition that he
of the facts out of which the charge
arose.'' There is nothing in the present case to indieate that
the
of
were eouditioned on anything other
and
as to their
of the facts out o£ which the
arose. It
follows that the
Defendant relics upon the i:itatement in People v. vValihm·
(1938), 27 Cal.App.2d 583, 591
[81 P.2d
, that
"\Vhen a codefendant who is a coconspirator has been offered
immunity from prosecution in reward for his testimony, the
cause should be promptly dismissed against him. Otherwise,
the maintenance of the action against him throughout the
trial may serve to intimidate the witness and furnish an
inducement for him to color his testimony." vVe may assume
that it would be better practice, lending credibility to the
accomplices' testimony, to have promptly sentenced them,
but we cannot believe that the failure so to do was so serious
a matter that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.
[22] Defemlant complains of ihc trial court's failure to sustain his objection to, and to grant his motion to strike, the
testimony of J oscph Kurrus, a proceRs server for the district
attorney. Kurrus testified that he twice served a subpoena
on Ernest Gallo, the person in whose room defPndant was
arrested, to appear at the trial, and that he again attempted
to serve him but could not find him. Gallo did not appear
at the trial. The prosecuting attorney in argument said, "I
would like to have had :M:r. Gallo here . . . to clear up some
of the inconsistencies in the defendant's story, but we have
been unable to locate him, although we have tried diligently."
Defendant argues that Kurrus' testimony was presented to
confuse the jury and cast suspicion on defendant by an
implication that Gallo's testimony would be favorable to the
prosecution. Gallo's testimony would cleady have been material. Although there is no showing that it would have been
favorable to the prosceution, the prosecution was entitled to
explain why Gallo was not produeed, to forestall any question
which might arise in the minds of the jury as to why Gallo
did not testify. (Sec People v. Clark (1895), 106 Cal. 32, 38
[39 P. 53]; People v. Schunke (1934), 140 Cal.App. 544, 549
[35 P.2d 388].)
[23] Defendant complains that the trial court erred in
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of Officer
in rebuttal, by
of a conversation from a transcript
and
him whether the conversation occurred. 'fo show
that defendant made
statements contrary to his
the
defendant: He was asked if he reealled
on
8,
about
p. m. in the presence of M:r Gallo
and Off1eers 0
and Hooper
that he did. Defendant was then asked if he
portion of the conversation : "Mr. Gallo
made a
and after that O'Mara said to Gallo, 'Now,
you told us tl1at he broug-ht them over to have you sell them
for him.' And Gallo said, 'That's
At first I thought
the eoats were not stolen. In
I clidn 't think
were
stolen because I didn't think he would be jeopardizing himself.' And you said, 'Of conrsr not.' And Gallo said, 'I didn't
tell him where
eame from. bec-ause I didn't know where
they carne from.' And you said, 'I thought his laundry was
in the box.' And Farquarson said, '\Vhose laundry?' And
you said, 'Ferguson's laundry.' '' The only answer which
defrndant gave to the above quotrd question was, "I never
said 'Ferguson's laundry' at any time. Hooper said that."
Defendant was askrcl if he rcr.:nlled tlw following portion of the conyrrsation: '"l'hcm Gallo said: 'Don't try
to put the blame on me,' and thrn Hooper said to you: 'Is
this man
nhout the whole affair, then?' . . . You said:
'Now, look, the man may have had thoughts about it, the man
is not a liar, but I din not have a conversation 'IYith him about
selling fun;.' " Drfendant answrrrd, "I did not say that,
no. He [IIooprrJ called Mr. Gallo a damned liar at that
time.''
On rebuttal, when Officer Hooper was testifying, the prosecuting attorney identified the foregoing conversation and
asked, "During that conversation, sir. were the following
questions asked and the following answers given--"
Defense counsel objected on the ground "that that is leading
and suggestive.'' The objection was overruled and the examination proceeded as follows:
"Q. By MR. STOVITZ
attomey J : lVIr. Lyons
said, 'I thought his Ianmhy was in that box,' and Officer l<'arquarson said, '\Vhose
?' And Mr.
said, 'Ferguson's laundry.'
"\Vere those questions ask0d and did Mr. I1yons say,
'Ferguson's laundry~' A. Yes, he did.
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"Q. During that conversation, sir, were the following questions asked and did Mr. Lyons make the following answers,
Mr. Lyons made the statement, 'No, I don't recall hearing
it,' and Gallo said, 'Don't try to put the blame on me.'
And you said to Mr. Lyons, 'Is this man lying about this
whole affair, then?' And Lyons said, 'Now, look. The man
may have had thoughts about it. The man is not a liar, but
I did not have a conversation with him about selling furs.'
"MR. RICHARD CANTILLON [defense counsel]: That is objected to as improper cross-examination.
"THE CouRT: It is rebuttal.
"MR. STOVITZ: Yes, this is rebuttal, your Honor. I asked
Mr. Lyons that question.
"Q. Did Mr. Lyons make that statement at that time, 'No,
now, look. The man may have had thoughts about it. The
man is not a liar, but I did not have a conversation with him
about selling furs.'
"MR. CANTILLON: I will object to that, your Honor, on
the ground it is leading and suggestive. I don't know why
we just don't ask the officer what was said. He is reading
from a transcript . . . and all he does is answer 'Yes' every
time he asks him a question. . . . [This question was not
answered.]
'' Q. By MR. STOVITZ: Were the following questions asked
and did Mr. Lyons give the following answers-you, Mr.
Hooper, made the statement: 'The first you knew that he
had more than one fur was when you saw this darker-colored
fur1'
"Mr. Gallo said: 'The following morning at my place.'
''And you said: 'I see you are nodding your head, Mr.
Lyons. Does that mean you are agreeing with the story~'
"And Mr. Lyons said: 'No, no. We had a long conversation that \Vednesday night. A discussion was had about
many different subjects. I never had these two items in my
possession at any time. We were just having a conversation.
I never offered those for sale. Ferguson had them in the
box. I don't know what Ferguson had.'
"Vvas that statement made, sir? A. Yes, it was."
"While the questioning was somewhat confusing, and the
so-called rebuttal is not all strictly rebuttal, it is apparent that
defendant could not have been prejudiced in this regard.
[24] Officer 0 'Mara vms called on rebuttal and testified that
the conversation in question was recorded and that the tran. script thereof from which the prosecuting attorney read ·as
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above quoted was typed by a clerk in his presence. Without
objection he testified affirmatively to the question whether
defendant made the statement that he thought Ferguson's
laundry was in the box.
On cross-examination of 0 'Mara the following occurred:
"Q. Can you tell me who drew a line through the name
Lyons before the semi-colon and the words, 'I thought his
laundry was in that box,' sir~ (Showing document to the
witness.) Who drew this line straight through the middle of
the word Lyons 1 A. I don't know.
'' Q. Who wrote out in the paragraph opposite that statement and apparently erased the word 'Gallo'~ A. I don't
know. It is not my ·writing."
Defendant complains that the transcript was altered. But
there is nothing in the record which shows that the transcript was not altered to correct it so that it would reflect
the truth.
Further cross-examination of dcfenda11t from a transcript
of his questioning by Officers Armstrong and Hooper and
further cross-examination concerning the questioning of defendant in Gallo's presence at 4 o'clock on April 8, could
not have been error prejudicing defendant.
[25] Defendant asserts that the prosecution wilfully suppressed "vital finger print evidence." 'l'he factual basis of
this contention is as follows: The accomplice Pope testified
that he paid Ferguson a total of $100 for which Ferguson
obtained a driver's license for Pope under the name "Robert
Englund''; that Ferguson told Pope that ''a person who
answered my general description'' had applied for the license;
Pope believed that defendant was present during some of the
conversations which led to the obtaining of the false license.
The license was received in evidence at the request of defendant but marked as a People's exhibit. Defendant called Officer Hooper to the stand and he answered negatively questions
whether he had caused an examination of the thumb print
and signature on the license to be made and whether he had
any idea whose thumb print and handwriting appeared thereon. To the question ''And as you sit there now you have no
idea who wrote on that application 1" Officer Hooper testified,
"No, I don't." The prosecuting attorney said, "That's
objected to, your Honor, as being immaterial unless he has
an idea as to who caused it. We all have an idea after listening to the evidence.'' The court ruled, ''Well, the answer
may stand."
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It is defendant's
the
evidence that the thumb
that the
attorney,
an idea after listening to the
thumb
was that of defendant. This argument is maniwithout merit. No such
appears from the
prosecuting attorney's statement
''after
to
the evidence" it would appear that
obtained the
license for Pope on
of an unidentified person
"who answered [Pope
. . . general description." If defendant thought that any implication arose that the thumb
print was his, he was not prevented from offering evidence
that it was not.
As previously stated, Officer Hooper testified that when
defendant was questioned about the watch he "said it was
his, that he had had it for some time.'' Defendant testified
that he did not make such a statement. [26] On defense
counsel's cross-examination of Officer Hooper he testified that
the interrogation of defendant was recorded but that he did
not have a transcript of the conversation concerning the
watch which is the subject of count 5. Asked whether the
conversation concerning the watch was recorded, Hooper
answered, "No, I don't know whether that portion was
recorded or not." Defendant argues that "it was manifest
injustice for the police, and District Attorney, to suppress
this recording. Obviously, a play-through of it would have
exonerated the Appellant, and supported his statement that
he made no such utterance . . . . It is inherently improbable
that this part of the supposed recordation was not made. . . .
If there was a record, it should have been produced and played
for the jury."
There is nothing in the record to support defendant's assertions that this portion of the conversation was recorded
and the recording suppressed. The conversation occurred immediately after defendant was taken to the office of the police,
and it may well have been that the recording of defendant's
questioning had not commenced. In the absence of some
factual support therefor, defendant's charge that a tape recording was deliberately suppressed is not ·well taken.
[27] Defendant complains that the jury were not instructed that private transactions are presumed to be fair
and regular (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963. subd. 19) and that the
court "gave no instruction embodying the principle that a
defendant is presumed to speak the truth and that unless

271

PEOPLE

defendant

any such
that although there
was abundant evidence
by defendant concerning
his
to the persou;; eom1eeted with the ease the
court gave no instrudion at all
the standard to be
the
in
defendant's
It is true that there was no instruetion spec-ifically directed
to defendant's explanation of events as
to that of
any other witness. But the court instrueted the jury at length
concerning the apprai.~al of the
of ·witnesses. Among
other things the jury were told that ''A witness is presumed
to speak the truth. This presumption, however, may be repelled by the manner in which he testifies; his interest in the
case, if any, or his bias or prejudice, if any, for or against
any of the parties; by the charaeter of his testimony, . . . or
by contradictory evidence."
[28] ''It has been repeatedly held to be improper for the
court to single out a partieular witness and to charge the jury
how l1is evidence should be eonsidcred. [Citations.]" (People
v. McDannel (1949), fl4 Cal.App.2d
88!J [5} [211 P.2d
910]; aeeord, People v. Emmett (1932), 123 Cal.App. 678,
683 l7] [12 P.2d 92]; PeozJlc v. Quon Poo (1922), 57 Cal.App.
237,241 [6] l206 P. 1028].)
[29] Defeudant's requested and refused instruction that
'"£he fact that an indictment has been filed . . . is not to be
considered by you . . . on the proposition of the guilt or
innocenee of this dcfendaut '' and that the plea of not guilty
raises the pr0sumption of inuw:cnee, was covered by other,
more aeeurate instruetions.
[30] Defeudant complaim; of the r·efnsal of the following
instruetion: '' \Vhere the Distriet A Horney has arbitrarily
seleeted one or more alleged co-conspirators to whom he has
tell(lerecl immunity from proseet!lion in reward for his [turning] State's evidence against his allrgwl eollrgtw, such evidence is open to snsnieion, and nlH1er Rneh eiremnsianees the
testinwn.\' of an allPg:rd
should be examined
with great care." The snbsht11ce of this instrnetion was
eovc'rerl b)' the following instrnetions '''hieh were giYen:
" [T-p1e testimony of an aceornplire ought to be viewed
with distrust. 'L'his does not mc'an that you may arbitrarily
disregard such testimony, but you should
to it the weig·ht
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to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care
and caution and in the light of all the eYidence in the case."
The presumption that a witness speaks the truth "may be
repelled by . . . his interest in the case, if any, or his bias
or prejudic8, if any, for or against any of the parties . . . . ''
[31a] Defendant complains that the trial court did not of
its own motion instruet the jury that "the alleged admission
of the defendant could not itself be used to establish guilt,
nor <:onld suc:h admi~sion lJe used. unless the eorpus delicti of
the crime charged be imlependently proved.'' Defendant cites
People v. Fl'ey (1!H3), 165 Cal. 140, 147 [131 P. 127], where
it was held error for the court to fail to instruct as to "the
true rule w.ith reference to the admission of confessions and
the necessity for independent proof of the corpus delicti."
But it has been held that failure to instruct that proof independent of the extrajudicial statements of defendant is
necessary to prove the corpus delicti, although error, is not
reversible where there was evidence independent of such
statements. (People v. Clark (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 134, 141
[4] [255 P.2d 7D]; People v. Chan Chaun (1940), 41 Cal.App.
2d G8G, 5D2 [8] [107 P.2d 455].)
[32] The uncorroborated tc"stimony of the accomplices was
sufficient to estalJlish the corpus delieti. (People v. Pearson
(193D), 111 Cal.App.2d 9, 28 [37] [244 P.2d 35]; People v.
Snyder (1925), 74 Cal.App. 1:l8, 148-144 [5] [239 P. 70G].)
[31b] \Ve are satisfied that in the cireumstances of this case
the failure of the court, of its own motion, to give the subject
instruction was not prejudieial error.
[33] Defendant complains that without the request of
the jury armed guards took the exhibits, including the allegedly stolen property, into the jury room; that this was
an improper influenC'e on the jury whieh unfairly induced
them to believe that the property was stolen. The only support in the record for this argument is the following entry in
the clerk's minutes: "the jury retires for its deliberations.
·without the presence of the jury, and with defendant and
his eounscl and the Deputy District Attorney present, defendant objeets to jury haYing the exhibits with them and
moves that the exhibits be withdrawn from the jury under
PC 11:37. The motion is denied and all exhibits that are admitted in eviden('e are permitted to be taken by the jury to
the jury room.''
Section 1187 of the Penal Code provides, "Upon retiring
for deliberation, the jury may take with them all papers (ex-
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cept depositions) which have been received as evidence in the
cause, or copies of such public records or private documents
given in evidence as ought not, in the opinion of the court,
to be taken from the person having them in possession. . . . ''
Defendant concedes that the jury may also take clothing which
had been introduced in evidence into the jury room (citing
People v. Hower (1907), 151 Cal. 638, 645-646 [91 P. 507] ;
People v. Mahoney (1888), 77 Cal. 529, 531-532 [20 P. 73]).
In People v. Van Skancler ( 1937), 20 Cal.App.2d 248, 255256 [8] [66 P.2d 1228], the prosecuting attorney, during
argument, handed exhibits to the jury without request and
told them that they could take the exhibits into the jury room
with them. Defendant's contention that there was error in
handing exhibits to the jury without their requesting them
was rejected. In People v. Morales (1943), 60 Cal.App.2d
196, 198 [2] [140 P.2d 461], the clerk, without the jury
having made any request for exhibits, handed them to the
jury. Defendant contended that it was error for this to have
been done without a specific request by the jury. The appellate court says, ''Assuming, but not holding, that any error
appears no prejudice is shown and any possible error in this
regard would not justify a reversal."
Here, assuming that the exhibits were taken into the jury
room by "armed guards" without request by the jury, we
are not prepared to hold that such conduct was error. It does
not appear that such conduct could exert any improper influence on the jury, or could influence them to believe that
the assertedly stolen exhibits were in fact stolen.
[34] Defendant contends that his motion for a severance
of his trial from that of Pope should have been granted. He
complains that the number of challenges to the jury was
limited and that the psychological effect of Pope's arising
from the defense end of the counsel table and testifying
against defendant was damaging to defendant. There is no
showing that defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges
to the jury. Therefore, it does not appear that he was prejudiced in this regard. (See People v. Griffin (1950), 98 Cal.
App.2d 1, 49 [25] [219 P.2d 519].) [35] Nor do we believe that defendant was prejudiced by the fact that Pope
sat at the defense end of the counsel table before trstifying
against drfendant. It should be noted that if defendant and
Pope had been tried separately Pope could have testified
against defendant. (People v. Burdg ( 1928), 95 Cal.App.
259, 268 [6] [272 P. 816].)
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[36] Defendant asserts that there was a fatal variance
between the pleading of count 6 of the indictment and the
proof in that the proof established that defendant was guilty
of burglary as a conspirator rather than of receiving stolen
property. Defendant relies upon the Texas law that if there
pursuant to which a thief steals and delivers
..-.~"n.""''" to defendant, and there remains some act to be done
by defendant with the property pursuant to the common design, defendant is
as a thief and cannot be convicted
of receiving stolen property. (Evans v. State (1948), 152
Tex.Crim.Rep. 58 [211 S.W.2d 207, 209 [6]] ; Mcinnis v.
State (1932), 122 Tex.Crim.Rep. 128 [54 S.W.2d 96, 98 [2,
3]]; Byrd v. State (1931), 117 Tex.Crim.Rep. 489 [38 S.W.2d
332, 333-334].) It is defendant's position that the testimony
of the accomplices shows that defendant was a member of a
conspiracy to commit the burglaries, was liable as a burglar,
and therefore could not commit the crime of receiving stolen
property from himself. The jury's verdict on its face sufficiently resolves this argument against defendant. Defendant
was found not guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary and
to receive stolen goods. This interpretation of the evidence
was permissible. Defendant could be found guilty as a receiver not pursuant to a prearranged plan but as a transaction
independent of the burglary. [37] And on the other hand,
if we assume that defendant and the accomplices agreed in
advance that the accomplices should steal the property and
defendant would receive it, the legal effect of such conspiracy
would not be to exonerate any of its participants from any
crime committed pursuant to the agreement but, rather, would
support a holding that all ''are accomplices in the offense or
offenses resulting from execution of such plan." (People v.
Lima (1944), 25 Cal.2d 573, 577 [2], 578 [3] [154 P.2d 698].)
Defendant urges that the trial court erred in failing to
grant him a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence contained in the affidavit of one Robert Erwin Morgan.
Morgan, an inmate of Folsom, made the following averments:
Officer Hooper approached him while he was in the county
jail. Morgan had left a fur coat with defendant as a part
payment of a retainer for legal services and was "hot" at
defendant because defendant refused to return the coat.
Hooper said, "we are led to believe that if any man could
sack him [defendant J up you could do it.... Would you be
willing to say that you had given a stolen mink coat to
Lyons?'' Morgan answered, ''I couldn't do that because the
coat was not stolen." When Morgan insisted that "I could
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another man in
'' Officer Armstrong, who
"\Vise guys like you belong in Folsom
was also
and
God I'll see that
end up there and for your information I'll have
jail with you \vi thin twenty-four
hours and then you can both go to Folsom togethE-r."
Affidavits of defendant and his counsel to the effect that
the
evidence was newly discovered and could not
have been obtained by reasonable
at the time of trial
were presented.
An affidavit of Officer Hooper contradidiug Morgan's affidavit was filed.
[38] It has been held that "On a motion for a new trial,
where conflicting affidavits are :filed, the question of fact is
one for the determination of the trial judge and his determination will not be disturbed upon appeal if there is substantial evidence, as there was in the instant case, to sustain his :finding." (People v. Young (1938), 26 CaLApp.2d
700, 703 [4] [80 P.2d 138]; see also People v. Kawasaki
(1913), 23 Cal.App. 92, 99 [137 I'. 287].) [39] Furthermore, it does not appear reasonably probable that this evidence, cumulative and impeaching, would have caused the jury
to reach a different conclusion regarding the guilt of defendant. (People v. Peyton (1941), 47 Cal.App.2d 214, 224 [8]
[117 P.2d 683].)
[ 40] Defendant meritoriously contends that the receipt
by him of the two items of property which are, respectively, the
subjects of counts 5 and 6, constituted only one criminal transaction and that therefore he should not have been sentenced
on two counts. The evidence of the accomplices shows that
defendant originally received the watch and the fur coat on
a single occasion. Therefore, but one offense of receiving
stolen property is shown, although the goods were stolen
from different sources, and the duality of the sentences, even
though they are ordered to run concurrently, cannot be permitted to stand. (People v. Smith (1945), 26 Cal.2d 854,
858-859 [4-7] [161 P.2d 941]; People v. Roberts (1953), 40
CaL2d 483, 491 [15-16] [254 P.2d 501].)
[41] In a situation such as this, if any substantial objective of justice would be served thereby, this court could reverse the judgments as to both counts 5 and 6, order such
counts consolidated, and remand the cause for rearraignment
of the defendant for sentence and for sentence on the consolidated count. Inasmuch, however, as it does not appear
that here either the state or the defendant will be prejudiced
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by a simple reversal as to one count and affirmance as to the
other, and as finality of adjudication will thereby be expedited, we conclude that the latter procedure is the more
desirable.
For the reasons above stated the judgment based on count
6 is reversed and the judgment based on count 5 and the order
denying a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent. I cannot agree that there was
sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony as required by section 1111 of the Penal Code. Insofar as the
watch (count 5) is concerned, we see that there was only
defendant's reply that he had had the watch for some time
whereas, in reality, he had received it the night before from
Dann Rio as, according to defendant, partial payment for
attorney fees. There is no evidence in the record to show that
defendant knew of the stolen character of the watch as
required by section 496, subdivision 1 of the Penal Code.
People v. Lopez, 126 Cal.App.2d 274 [271 P.2d 874], relied
upon by the majority, was a case with an entirely different
factual situation. In the Lopez case, the defendant made
several different answers concerning his possession of stolen
property. In the case at bar we have only defendant's statement that he had had the watch for some time. There is
nothing to contradict his statement that it was given to him
by Rio in part payment of attorney fees, and absolutely
nothing to show that he knew of the stolen character of the
watch.
With respect to the fur coat (count 6), the record shows
that two of defendant's soiled shirts were in the P AA bag
with the fur coat; that the bag was in the same room where
defendant was found with the accomplices. The testimony
concerning defendant's possession of the bag containing the
fur coat is extremely dubious. The first witness testified that
the accomplice had been carrying the blue bag marked with
the letters P AA; thereafter the witness was contacted by
Officer Hooper, although there had been an order sequestering
witnesses, and changed his testimony so that it then showed
that defendant had been carrying the P AA bag which contained the fur coat. The only testimony in the record showing
defendant might have had knowledge of the stolen character
of the coat was that of accomplices.
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It should be noted that practically all of the lengthy summations of the evidence in the majority opinion consist of
various transactions between the accompliees conrerning fur
coats and jewelry with the theft or receipt of which defendant
was not charged. All of the a1lrg:ed conversations whi(oh would
tend to show defendant's knowledge that the fur and wateh
were stolen were testified to by accomplices and such testimony was not corroborated. 'l'he faet that defendant was
present in the room where the fur coat was found is surely
not such corroboration as that called for by section 1111 of
the Penal Code where it is drc-lared "and the corroboration
is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense
or the circumstances thereof .... " It appears to me that the
so-called corroborating evidence requires "interpretation and
direction from the testimony of the accomplice'' in order
to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime
charged.
I find no substantiation in the record for the conclusion
reached by the majority that the defendant "received the
watch and fur coat on a single occasion," and that there was
but one offense involved. Defendant received the watch on
the night of April 7th. The only testimony linking him, even
in the slightest degree, to the fur coat was concerning events
on the 8th of April. There is nothing whatsoever to show that
the watch and fur coat constituted a single occasion or part
of a single offense. The majority opinion in its endeavor to
show that there was corroboration of the accomplice testimony
has this to say: "To show that there is inculpatory evidence
apart from the testimony of the accomplices we first set forth
a summary of such inculpatory evidence. Defendant himself
testified as follows: He was a lawyer with practice largely
in the field of criminal law. He represented Ferguson [an
accomplice], who was charged in a federal case 'Nith conspiracy [etc.] . . . " It is apparent that the majority consider
the fact that defendant represented criminals as corroborating
evidence of the accomplice testimony. This is, of course, another instance where guilt by association is used to establish
the fact of the crime charged. It is also the first case where,
to my knowledge, an attorney who represents a person accused
of crime has been considered as either an accomplice or as a
principal to the crime charged. But here we have defendant's
representation of the accomplices considered as "inculpatory
evidence.''
As the court held in People v. Re1:ngolcl, 87 Cal.App.2d 382,
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"'While it is true that the corroborative
tends to connect the defendalthough it is slight,
to but little considerestablished in our law

n10re.
to
in the erime raises no
of guilt and is immffieient corroboration
v. Braun, :n
593, 601
P.2d 728]);
assoeiation with the actual perpetrators of the erime also gives
rise only to a suspicion of guilt that he
encouraged
and participated in the crime and is insuffieient corroboration
(People v. Bra1ln, 31 Cal.App.2d 593, 601 [88 P.2d 728] ;
People v. Long, 7 Ca1.App. 27 [93 P. 387];
v. Koening,
99 Cal. 574 [34 P. 238]; Prople v. Fagan, 98 Cal. 230 [33 P.
60]). In People v.
109 Cal.App.2d 184, 188 [ 240 P.2d
327], the eourt said: 'l'hat while conflicting statements may
tend to discredit the witness "they are not evidenl'e of the
fact'' in issue.
·when defendant sought to show Officer Hooper's bias and
prejudice by cross-examiuing him as to the number of times
he had contacted Pope, an original codefendant, conspirator,
and witness for the prosecution, the proposed line of questioning was prohibited
the trial court. .Although the scope
of cross-examination is largely within the discretion of the
trial court, a considerable latitude should he allowed to
show the witness' state of mind and possible bias. (People v.
W'inston, 46 Cal.2d 151, 157 [293 P.2d 40] ; People v. Pantages, 212 Cal. 237, 255 [297 P. 890] ; People v. Evans, 113
Cal.App.2d 124, 127 [247 P.2d 915] .) Under the peculiar
facts of this ease it appears to me that defendant should
have been permitted to (1uestion Hooper as to the number of
times he had been ·with Pope. It will be recalled that the
People dismissed the charges against Pope (after the commencement of the trial) who then became a witness for the
People. Inasmuch as there is only Offleer Hooper's statement concerning defendant's reply when asked about the
watch, his statement to defendant about an "anti-police"
feeling, and the fact that he contacted Officer Roberts about
the "mistake" in his testimony eonceru ing defendant's possession of the blue bag, marked PAA, it appears to me that
the defendant should have been permitted wide latitude in
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to show bias and prejudice
against the
·when it is considered that the corroborative evidence as to the watch consisted entirely of
Officer Hooper's statement, it becomes immediately apparent
that the jury was entitled to have before it any available
evidence on the matter of bias and prejudice.
It is argued that it was prejudicial error for the People
to make the following statement in that it left the inference
with the
that the prosecution had personal knowledge of
the gnilt of the defendant: "Maybe this is a good point to
bring up right now, but it is not the function of the District
Attorney's office to go around recklessly indicting people
and bringing charges against them. Our duties are not to
prosecute people just for the sake of making prosecutions.
It is our duty to protect the citizens of this County against
crimes." There was no objection by defense counsel and no
request at the time for an instruction admonishing the jury,
although an instruction was given to the effect that statements
of counsel did not constitute evidence in the case. A case somewhat similar is People v. Hale, 82 Cal.App.2d 827 [187 P.2d
121], where the district attorney in his argument to the jury
referred to the fact that the grand jury had indicted the
defendants ''on the theory that both defendants were guilty
. . . " and after objection by defense eounsel which was overruled by the court, the district attorney concluded with this
statement: ''That is why I say the grand jury was right when
they indicted both of them.'' The court in the Hale case held
that as to one defendant where the evidence of guilt was
"much weaker" the remarks of the district attorney constituted prejudicial and reversible error. It appears that even
had there been a request for an admonition at this time the
error would not have been cured. The quoted remark assumes
the guilt of the defendant and was highly prejudieial under
the facts of the case. (People v. Hale, 82 Cal.App.2d 827
[187 P.2d 121]; People v. Berryman, 6 Ca1.2d 331 [57 P.2d
136]; People v. Vienne, 142 Cai.App.2d 172 [297 P.2d 1027];
People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 676 [245 P.2d 633].)
Another instance of misconduct on the part of the district
attorney which appears to have been highly inflammatory and
prejudicial is the following statement made during closing
argument: ''And there has been only the insinuation, the
insinuation that all of the People's witnesses who were accomplices or in any way connected with defendant, were allowed
to plead guilty to only one or two Counts. Ladies and gentle-
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men of the jury, that is a matter, I believe, of common
knowledge, that if there are three or four Counts against
some defendant, that defendant is permitted to take a plea
to one or more of the Counts. And even after three days of
trial they allowed Mr. Moeckel to plead guilty to two Counts
of Robbery. \Vhy ~ It is obvious. In his sentence the
Judge made the sentences run concurrently. \Vhy try him
on two or three of four Counts when he can be found guilty
on one Count or when he pleads guilty to one or two Counts~
The Judge made the sentences run concurrently. If we took
a plea of two Counts against Pope and one Cmmt against Mr.
Ji'ergnson, the big receiver, we will offer JJir. Lyons the same
considemtion. If at any time during this trial he wanted to
plead gtl·ilty to one Cmmt, or if he would like to do so even
now, we will give him the same consideration." ~~n objection
by defense counsel was sustained and the jury was admonished
to disregard the remark. Defendant argues that no admonition could have cured the error inasmuch as it stressed his
association with others who had pleaded guilty to the very
charges for which he was on trial. In my opinion, defendant's
argument is well tall:en and the remark constituted prejudicial
misconduct on the part of the district attorney. (People v.
Kirlces, 39 Cal.2d 719 [249 P.2d 1] ; People v. Teixeira, 136
Cal.App.2d 136 [288 P.2d 535]; People v. Bell, 138 Cal.App.
2d 7 [291 P.2d 150] .)
In another instance it appears that the district attorney,
in his argument to the jury, committed misconduct : ''And
some of the jewelry is not in evidence. And the reason for
that is because \Ye could not show Mr. I1yons' connection
with the other fur coats or with the other jewelry. The fur
coat carried in this bag, Exhibit 18 [the bag], was the ermine
coat, and that is here, but the fur coat carried by Mr. Ferguson in that cardboard box is not here because we can not show
Mr. Lyons' connection with that fur coat." It will be recalled
that whether defendant carried the blue bag containing the
fur coat was a very close issue of fact in the case. This
statement assumes that the defendant was carrying the bag
and that his guilt had been established. While there was no
request for an admonition, it appears that in this instance,
as in the preceding ones, an admonition would not have cured
the highly prejudicial effect created by the district attorney
in assuming personal knowledge of defendant's guilt.
Another instance of claimed prejudicial misconduct is the
district attorney's reference to the defendant as the ''mouth-
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piece" for the defendants who had pleaded guilty and whom
he had represented and was to represent in other criminal
matters. Defendant argues that this was an unwarranted
attack upon his character since the term carries with it an
unsavory connotation. It is my opinion that defendant's
claim that the term carries an unsavory connotation is well
taken. It also appears that the use of the term was unnecessary and that the prosecution should not indulge in defamatory remarks concerning the defendant in any criminal case
and that the practice should not be condoned by this court.
Standing alone it may not have prejudiced the jury unduly
but taken together with the other errors in the case it is difficult to determine just what effect the use of the term may
have had.
Defendant argues that he was denied due process of law in
that the sentencing of Pope, Ferguson, and Rio was continued
from time to time due to continuances in his case; that such
postponement of imposing sentences on these accomplices until
after the time defendant had been sentenced constituted intimidation and coercion of these witnesses against him. The
district attorney admitted that ''inducements'' had been extended: ''Counsel said there were inducements for Pope,
Ferguson and Rio to testify, and I would be trying to fool
you if I said there was not, ladies and gentlemen. The
plain, ordinary, hard facts in this case are that we had to
offer some inducements to Pope, Rio and Ferguson to testify.
But were they given complete immunity1 No. Have they
been given lesser sentences? No. They were treated like
every other criminal or any other person charged with a
crime. Rio was given a year in the county jail as a condition
of probation. That was apparently his first offense. He was
sentenced before he testified here, ladies and gentlemen. He
had nothing to gain and nothing to lose when he testified
here.
"MR. JAMES CANTIIJLON [attorney for defendant]: I object
to that your Honor. There was testimony that the sentence
to the burglary charge is still hanging over his head.
''THE CouRT: That has been argued pro and con, of course.
You may continue.
"MR. STOVITZ: How else would we get any testimony here,
ladies and gentlemen, other than by the testimony of the accomplices? These men who will have to live in confinement,
who will have to fear the ostracism that comes with being a
stool pigeon, how can you get these men to testify? We have
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to say to
we will tell the Judge you cooperated
in this case.' But are you going to say that the Judge is
corrupt when he takes a defendant's cooperation into consideration f I don't think you can say that. I think the District
Attorney's office has done its job here, and I think the Police
Department has done its job, and I think the judges have done
their job, and that is to protect you, ladies and gentlemen.''
Pope, admittedly guilty of burglary, was sentenced to one
year in the county jail and the remaining counts against him
were dismissed; Rio, also admittedly guilty of burglary, was
sentenced to a year in the county jaiL ·what sentence was
imposed on Ferguson does not appear, although the district
attorney stipulated as follows with defense counsel: ''His
[Ferguson's] plea of guilty was entered on May 10, 1955,
and the time for the sentence has been contintted from time
to time due to coniintwnces granted in the Lyons case." (Emphasis added.)
In People v. Walther, 27 Cal.App.2d 583, 591 [81 P.2d 452],
the court said: "When a codefendant who is a coconspirator
has been offered immunity from prosecution in reward for his
testimony, the cause should be promptly dismissed against
him. Otherwise, the maintenance of the action against him
throughout the trial may serve to intimidate the witness and
furnish an inducement for him to color his testimony. Moreover, retaining a person as a party defendant throughout the
trial, who has been promised immunity from prosecution in
reward for his evidence may become a mere subterfuge to
avoid the necessity of adhering to the established rule that the
fact of the existence of a conspiracy may not be proved by the
admissions of a coconspirator." It appears to me that the
same rule should apply to sentencing accomplices who have
pleaded guilty, in that refraining to do so until they have testified against one accused with them of conspiring, may very
well color their testimony in the hope that the sentence imposed on them will be commensurate with the cooperation
given by them to the prosecution. The People argue that there
was not the slightest evidence that any leniency would be
extended to these witnesses "only if their testimony resulted
in the conviction of the appellant .... " It would appear from
the district attorney's statement to the jury (heretofore
quoted) that these witnesses had been promised "inducements'' is sufficient to show that lenience had been promised
them for their testimony against defendant. In People v.
Green, 102 Cal.App.2d 831, 839 [228 P.2d 867], a witness had
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been promised
if he would
testimony which
would result in another being bound over for triaL The court
held that ''A miscarriage of justice was oe<:'asioncd through the
use by the State of testimony which, because of the condition
upon which immunity depended, was impure, dubious and
'tainted beyond redemption.' "
'l'he majority holds here
that no such condition existed in the case at bar and that no
reversible error is shown. While the admitted "indueements"
undoubtedly eonsisted of leniency in sentencing the aecompliees, it appears that the delay in senteneing thE' accompliees
until defendant's trial was cone luded was "in its practical
and legal effect, indistinguishable from a threat." (People v.
Green, S1lpra, at p. 838.)
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment
and order denying a new trial.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 27,
1958. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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Estate of EDWARD L. LBDBET'l'EH, Deceased. MAHK
WOOD, as Administrator, etc., Appellant, v. ,TOHN D.
LUTON, as Guardian, etc., Respondent.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Orders--Conclusiveness: Appeal-Appeal-

able Orders.-An order instructing the administrator of a
decedent's estate to sign a stipulation in settle1uent of the
estate's claim against the United StntPs for damages and to
concl.ude the settlement was appenlnhle (Proh. Code, ~ 1240),
and where no appeal was taken tlwt order became final.
[2] !d.-Compensation of Attorneys-Mode of Allowance.-Prob.
Code, § 911, providing that an "attomey [for the] ... administrator ... may apply to the court for an allowance upon his
fees" and the "court shall make an order requiring the . . .
administrator to pay such attorney out of the estate such com-

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, §§ 79, 89;
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 490.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 904 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, §§ 1118, 1129;
[2] Decedents' Estates, § 862; [3] Decedents' Estates, §§ 151.1,
886.

